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ABSTRACT 
	  
This article develops a theoretical model to explain how public opinion can lead to the 
deinstitutionalization of a practice.  Our model draws upon the ‘spiral of silence’ 
theory, that originated in the mass communication literature, and which suggests that 
social actors tend to support majority views.  At the micro level, this behavior triggers 
a spiral of silence that leads to homogenous public opinion.  We use analogical 
reasoning to posit the existence of a spiral of silence at the institutional field level.  
When public opinion becomes hostile to a particular practice, institutional fields tend 
to resist this external opposition.  Insiders face the dilemma of whether to align with 
the majority view expressed by public opinion, or to comply with the one expressed at 
the field level.  After discussing the mechanisms by which insider voices mediate and 
diffuse the hostility of public opinion at the field level, we discuss the boundary 
conditions applicable to our analogy.  Our paper advances the understanding of nested 
and connected climates of opinion and bridges the gap between insider- and outsider-
driven deinstitutionalization. 
 
Keywords: Public opinion, deinstitutionalization, spiral of silence, institutional field. 
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Deinstitutionalization is the process by which practices are abandoned because 
they have lost their social approval (Oliver, 1992; Scott, 2001).  Given that “all 
institutions are discursive products” (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004: 638), a 
deinstitutionalization process relies on discursive struggles between actors who push 
to abandon a practice and those who try to maintain it (Greenwood, Suddaby & 
Hinings, 2002; Green, 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008).  Studies of deinstitutionalization 
usually focus on opposing insider-driven and outsider-driven processes (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009), depending on whether the disruptive discourse occurs inside or outside 
the field.  While previous literature has acknowledged functional, political, and social 
maintenance or challenge of institutional arrangements (Oliver, 1992; Dacin, 
Goodstein & Scott, 2002), little has been said about the role of outsiders in this 
process (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  One premise of this literature is that institutional 
fields defend their existing practices by reacting en masse to outsider hostility 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013), especially when key 
insiders have a strong interest in maintaining institutionalized practices (Fiss, 
Kennedy & Davis, 2012).  However, discursive struggles around institutions usually 
happen simultaneously both within a field (Oliver, 1992) and outside, at the society 
level (Hauser, 1998), with one discourse influencing the other. 
 Consider different cases on how fields react when the public disapproves their 
practices.  Some fields consistently respond to external attacks by producing 
coordinated “defensive institutional texts” (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Sometimes, 
these discourses succeed in sustaining controversial practices, such as bonuses in the 
investment bank industry (Shlomo et al., 2013), and sometimes they fail, such as 
when agribusiness abandoned DDT (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  More generally, a 
closer look reveals that fields may respond heterogeneously to external pressures as 
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insiders split between those that take the side of the new hostile public climate and 
those who oppose it. 
Outsider-driven deinstitutionalization can indeed ignite a discursive battle 
among field insiders (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  However, given that previous 
research has taken an either/or approach – insider-driven vs. outsider-driven processes 
– little is known about how the two processes are linked, specifically how external 
discourse causes confrontation among insiders.  This paper looks at how public 
opinion can act as a form of outsider-driven deinstitutionalization by influencing 
discursive dynamics within a field.  Insiders are key actors in deinstitutionalizing a 
practice, as they can ultimately decide on whether to engage in a practice or not.  We 
bridge the gaps between multiple levels of discourse inherent in the 
deinstitutionalization process, and build a better understanding of existing links 
between outsider- and insider-driven deinstitutionalization.  Our paper analyzes the 
link between public opinion and field opinion, the expression of the dominant view at 
the institutional field level, and how this relationship contributes to the 
deinstitutionalization process.  
To study the role of public opinion in deinstitutionalizing a practice, we draw 
on an established mass communication theory known as the ‘spiral of silence’, that 
establishes how actors become less and less likely to express their voice when they 
perceive they are in the minority.  German political scientist, Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann, introduced this theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; 1977; 1993) as an effort to 
understand how individual actions and voices aggregate and eventually produce 
homogenous public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Scheufele & Moy, 2000).  
Because they fear being in the minority (Glynn, Hayes & Shanahan, 1997), people 
tend not to speak up when they normally would.  This triggers a spiral, which boosts 
 	   5 
the voice of those in the majority and inhibits the voice of the minority, resulting in a 
macro phenomenon we call public opinion.  While the spiral of silence theory 
originates in the mass communication literature, its mechanisms can work at different 
levels, such as small groups or organizations (Price & Allen, 1990; Blackmon & 
Bowen, 2003).  We propose that a spiral of silence can also develop at the 
institutional field level, where field opinion enhances or inhibits insider voices.  The 
spiral of silence theory helps to reduce these two macro phenomena (public and field 
opinion), to micro processes (such as social actors’ voices), which lends itself to 
analytical study.  
 This analogy between public sphere and institutional field as two parallel 
discursive spaces forms the basis of our theoretical framework (Noelle-Neumann, 
1993).  Our conceptual blending relies on a constitutive analogy. A constitutive 
analogy is a form of reasoning that “produces an entirely integrated conceptual 
representation” between the source domain and the target domain (Cornelissen and 
Durand, 2014: 9)1.  From the public opinion literature, we import causal dynamics 
and key concepts to understand the dynamics of institutional fields, but we also create 
an integrated framework that incorporates concepts taken from both communication 
and organization theory.  When applying the spiral of silence theory both at the public 
and field level, our theoretical model suggests that insider voices are the liaison 
between public and field opinions.  When public opinion starts to oppose an existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 According to Cornelissen and Durand (2014), a constitutive analogy is a ‘full’ analogy.  Thus, it 
differs from a heuristic analogy, which is only conceptual and episodic, and from a causal analogy, 
which relies on an asymmetric comparison between the source and the target domain. 
2	  Insiders will decide whether to align their voice with hostile public opinion or with favorable field 
opinion depending on the relative strength of the fear of isolation in the public sphere and in the field. 
On the public side, it is obvious that the greater the strength of public disapproval, the more likely it is 
for insiders to support public opinion versus the contrasting field opinion.  However, our focus is to 
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institutionalized practice, insiders feel torn between following the majority opinion in 
their field and going with the new hostile climate at the public level.  To understand 
insiders’ decisions to align with field opinion or public opinion, we examine the spiral 
of silence operating in the two respective spheres.  In the last section of this article, 
we specify the limitations of our analogy and the boundary conditions for the 
deployment of the spiral of silence in the field. 
 Our theoretical development builds on the emerging body of work bridging 
the gap between communication and institutional theory literature (Lammers & 
Barbour, 2006; Green, Babb & Alpaslan, 2008; Schultz & Wehmeier, 2010; Ganesh 
& Stohl, 2013).  We build on Suddaby’s (2011) radical stance that “patterns of 
communication determine social institutions” (Suddaby, 2011: 187), which extends 
Lammers’ (2011) concept of “institutional messages”.  We make several contributions 
to the existing literature.  First, research on institutional fields has alternated between 
macro- and micro-approaches. The spiral of silence has addressed a similar issue in 
the mass communication literature by linking public opinion to individual voices.  
Building on the analogy between the public sphere and institutional fields as 
discursive spaces, we propose that the spiral of silence theory can apply to 
institutional fields, where insider voices aggregate to form a field opinion.   
Second, we advance research on institutional fields, by hypothesizing the 
existence of overlapping and nested fields, which mutually influence each other.  
Insider voices bridge outsider-driven and insider-driven deinstitutionalization, and 
explain how external pressure can propagate among field members, despite the 
resistance of some of the insiders. Finally, by transposing the spiral of silence theory 
to the institutional level of analysis, we contribute to the mass communication 
literature by proposing the co-existence of different spirals of silence.  We use this 
 	   7 
insight to enrich the spiral of silence theory by showing that fear of being in the 
minority potentially can affect social actors across a broad range of discursive spaces. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Institutions are accumulations of beliefs and understandings, which 
progressively become established facts, and ultimately condition and shape future 
actions (Scott, 2001; Lammers & Barbour, 2006). Institutions govern behaviors 
through the institutionalization of practices, with penalties as the consequence of 
deviation from these (Jepperson, 1991).  Once institutionalized, practices evolve to be 
the most natural way to act (Oliver, 1992).  Although recent research has improved 
our understanding of practice diffusion and variation (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010; 
Fiss, Kennedy & Davis, 2012; Gondo & Amis, 2013), less has been said about “the 
process by which the legitimacy of an established or institutionalized organizational 
practice erodes or discontinues” (Oliver, 1992: 564). 
Not only are studies on deinstitutionalization rare (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), 
but they tend to focus on insider-driven deinstitutionalization, when efforts to disrupt 
certain practices come from insiders (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  Given the 
increasing pressure of external actors to change accepted and profitable business 
practices on the grounds of safety, fairness or sustainability, scholars have recently 
been studying outsider-driven deinstitutionalization processes (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Guérard et al., 2013).  Previous studies have suggested that fields comprise a 
set of homogenous actors engaging in defensive institutional work (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009).  This process usually terminates when the practice becomes illegal (Bonardi & 
Keim, 2005; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) resulting in coercive abandonment of a 
practice.   
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This perspective has two main limitations.  First, not all practices can be 
outlawed, since they are outside the realm of the laws or because companies can use 
non-market strategies to lobby the government and keep existing practices in place.   
Triggering voluntary abandonment of a practice by field members can therefore be 
more effective than coercive pressure. Second, and more importantly, not all insiders 
decide to resist; some might align with public hostility, instigating a struggle with 
other field members.  Taking these factors into consideration, this paper describes 
situations in which outsider-driven deinstitutionalization triggers a confrontation 
among insiders, resulting in a voluntary abandonment of a practice. 
“Institutions are discursive products” (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004: 638) 
and rely on interactions between existing justifications and challenges from emergent 
discourses (Green, 2004; Green, Babb & Alpaslan, 2008).  Therefore, any change in 
practice adoption needs to be accompanied by a change in its underlying and 
supporting discourses. One of the difficulties of studying processes of 
deinstitutionalization is that many actors intervene at different levels.  We propose 
that besides the mediating effect of regulation, discursive dynamics outside the field 
exert a direct influence on the discourse among insiders (Bonardi & Keim, 2005).  
This is because discursive struggles usually occur at the same time in the institutional 
field and in the public sphere (Hauser, 1998). The discursive nature of institutions and 
the fact that the discourse happens at multiple levels of analysis allow us to study the 
impact of public opinion on institutions.  This study enhances the understanding of 
the relationship between insider-driven and outsider-driven deinstitutionalization 
(Oliver, 1992), by bridging the gap between the discursive spheres at societal and 
field levels. 
 
Institutional Fields, Field Opinion, and Deinstitutionalization of Practices 
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 Institutional fields are social arenas where actors coalesce around a common 
purpose (Hoffman, 1999).  They consist of the set of actors (either individual or 
organizations) who directly engage in a practice.  Discourses within a field are crucial 
to the creation, continuation and abandonment of a practice (Green et al., 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2002).  These discourses rely on opinions or the “outward 
expression of a mental attitude” (Grunig, 1979: 741) which, over time, culminate in 
the existence of a dominant view (Converse, 1987).  This dominant opinion exerts a 
form of social control and pressures individual actors to conform (Oshagan, 1996).  
The institutional field is a reference group for its members, namely a “group whose 
perspective constitutes the frame of reference of the actor” (Oshagan, 1996: 337); and 
reference groups exert a strong pressure on decision making (Oshagan, 1996; Glynn 
& Park, 1997; Neuwirth & Frederick, 2004; Kim, 2012).  
At the institutional field level, engaging in a disapproved behavior produces 
social sanctions for members who are caught red-handed (Glynn & Huge, 2007).   
Because others can observe and judge such behaviors, the field’s view about what 
constitutes the most appropriate way to act prevails.  Conforming to the dominant 
view leads to social approval, and non-conformists incur social penalties, such as 
‘losing face’ (Ho et al., 2013).  The opinion of other insiders conditions social actors’ 
engagement in a practice (Rimal & Real, 2005).  Rimal and Real (2003: 185) 
established that peers perceptions of behavioral norms strongly affect engagement in 
practices, based on “how widespread a behavior is among referent others” and the 
threats and benefits of compliance, or non-compliance. 
As the first building block of our analogy between the public and institutional 
fields as two discursive arenas, we call the overall climate of opinion at the field level 
field opinion, to mirror the concept of public opinion.  Field opinion represents the 
 	   10 
dominant view of insiders in a field about a given topic or practice.  A practice has to 
be socially approved in order to be institutionalized (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), 
meaning it requires the support of field opinion. By contrast, any efforts to 
deinstitutionalize a practice, even if originated outside of a field, eventually entail a 
change of discourse among members of the field.  Then, when field opinion opposes a 
practice, that practice is likely to be abandoned.  Therefore, we conceive the 
deinstitutionalization of a practice as a two-stage process whereby field opinion 
becomes hostile to a practice and consequently exerts pressure on its actors to 
abandon it. 
 
Field Opinion as Nested in the Public Opinion 
Insiders engage in discursive struggles not only in their own fields, but also in 
other broad social arenas.  The broadest level is public opinion, which arises from 
population-wide dialogues (Hauser, 1998).  The concept of public opinion comes 
originally from Plato’s notion of doxa, the common belief or the popular way of 
thinking (Crombie, 2012).  Since then, philosophers have described how people seek 
approval from others by behaving in ways they know others will approve.  During the 
Renaissance, Michel de Montaigne, among others, was concerned with the influence 
that public opinion exerts on social life.  He elaborates on the human tendency to 
behave in conformity with commonly held views, a behavior which is triggered by the 
pursuit of others’ approval (Montaigne, 1958).  In the same vein, John Locke, in his 
“Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” published in 1690 (Locke, 1998), 
establishes the law of opinion as the most powerful dictum in modern societies, a 
source of social pressure that compels individuals to adopt the perspective of the 
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majority.  Public opinion is therefore a form of social control (Noelle-Neumann, 
1993). 
Public opinion pressures individuals to conform to prevailing views (McLeod 
& Hertog, 1992; Scheufele, 2008) in order to obtain social approval in the eyes of the 
general public.  Because the public observes and judges behaviors (and punishes 
deviant individuals), it dictates what constitute the most natural ways to act (Glynn et 
al., 2005).  As stressed by Noelle-Neumann, the coercive role of public opinion arises 
from the moral dimension of contentious matters (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Scheufele 
& Moy, 2000), thus it relies mostly on normative processes, well identified by 
institutional theorists (Scott, 2001).  To explain the normative pressure of public 
opinion, Scheufele (2008) cites the debate about stem cell research (the practice of 
using human embryos for research).  Because it is difficult to obtain objective 
answers to such questions, public opinion provides a critical indication of what 
position to take: in other words, the opinion of the majority appears to be the right 
way to think and eventually shapes individuals’ perceptions when they seek to make 
sense of their environments (McLeod & Hertog, 1992).  
 Because they are part of both a field and the society, insiders feel pressure 
from both field and public opinion.  However, public opinion works at a broader 
level, which is why we posit that field opinion is nested in, and therefore influenced 
by, public opinion.  Previous literature has mainly looked at the role of public opinion 
in policy-making (Burstein, 2003; Habermas, 2001).  Public opinion can exert 
pressure on politicians seeking re-election, to make some practices illegal (Bonardi & 
Keim, 2005).  However, the effect of public opinion on the engagement of practices is 
not necessarily mediated by the government.  Our paper focuses on ways, besides 
making it illegal, that public opinion influences the deinstitutionalization of a practice.  
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To understand the role of public opinion in deinstitutionalization processes more 
fully, we need to understand the micro-processes that link the two macro phenomena 
(public opinion and field opinion).  This leads us to our first research question: How 
does public opinion influence field opinion? 
Once we understand the detailed process through which public opinion 
influences field opinion, it ought to be possible to understand why some fields are 
more likely to respond to public opinion than others.  In some fields, members are 
very sensitive to public opinion, and in others, they are relatively insensitive.  The 
example of the investment banking industry is telling.  Since the economic crisis in 
2008, public opinion regarding maximization of shareholder value has become 
increasingly varied.  In the US, public opinion has shifted from full support of 
shareholder value maximization practices in the 1980s – the bonus system, extreme 
risk taking, focus on dividends (Ho, 2009; Madrick, 2011) – to a more mixed 
perspective, as a consequence of the discursive attacks that followed the 2008 failures 
(Roulet, Forthcoming).  However, these controversial practices have persisted 
(Shlomo et al., 2013).  Thus, our second research question aims to understand the 
causes of the variation in the way public hostility leads to the abandonment of a 
practice.  The answer to this question depends on the deployment of the spiral of 
silence within a field.  Figure 1 lays out our theoretical framework. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE  
The spiral of silence theory is one of the most prominent approaches to 
explain the formation of a climate of opinion.  Noelle-Neumann (1974; 1977; 1993; 
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1995) built the spiral of silence model inductively to understand the German election 
of 1965, in which the results came out quite differently than expected, with a clear 
victory for the Christian Democrats although they were thought to be neck and neck 
with the Social Democrats.  To help understand the puzzle, she used Tocqueville’s 
example of the Church’s decline in France before the revolution (Tocqueville, 1955).  
Tocqueville focused on the relative likelihood that individuals would voice their 
opinion rather than remain silent.  Both scenarios suggest that individuals feared 
being socially isolated and thus joined the majority, even if they disagreed with it.  In 
Tocqueville’s mind, public opinion is, paradoxically, the drawback to equality and 
freedom: being part of a multitude gives people confidence in the public’s judgment, 
which, in turn, subtly coerces individuals to avoid public disapproval by behaving in 
ways consistent with dominant opinion. 
 
The Spiral of Silence at the Public Level 
The spiral of silence approach posits the existence of a vicious circle: the 
longer members of a minority fail to express their views, the more unstoppable the 
spiral of silence becomes (see Figure 2).  The spiral of silence theory relies on a 
micro-level psychological phenomenon (Matthes et al., 2012; Neuwirth et al., 2007): 
social actors avoid expressing views, which they think are marginalized, and voice 
social judgments based on their perceptions of the majority opinion (Prentice & 
Miller, 1996; Ho et al., 2013).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Ultimately, the spiral of silence implies movement towards silencing minority 
opinions (Scheufele, 2008), although a hard core of supporters in the field may remain 
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(McDonald, Glynn, Kim & Ostman, 2001; Matthes, Morrison & Schemer, 2010).  
Empirical research supports the notion of fear of isolation (Noelle-Neumann & 
Petersen, 2004; Noelle-Neumann, 1993), as well as the relationship between 
perceptions of support for one’s opinion and one’s willingness to voice it (Glynn, 
Hayes & Shanahan, 1997).  This mechanism sets the spiral of silence in motion in a 
self-reinforcing circle.  Members of a minority are less likely to express their opinion, 
while members of a majority are more likely to voice theirs (Scheufele & Moy, 2000; 
Yanovitzky & Stryker, 2001; Scheufele, 2008). These dynamics lead to the 
emergence of a dominant opinion.  Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) theory bridges micro-
level behaviors - the decision to speak up or stay silent, and macro-level 
consequences - the emergence of dominant opinions and social norms.  The metaphor 
of a downward spiral suggests unidirectionality (Salmon & Glynn, 1996), the 
conclusion of which is that willingness to speak out tends to decrease to a point where 
the prevailing opinion becomes the only one. 
This “quasi-statistical” ability to understand public opinion and its evolution 
depends on three main elements: the voice of other people, the media, and 
interpersonal opinions (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003).  
The role of the voice of other people.  Voice is the key variable in Noelle-
Neumann’s (1993) model of public opinion, and it is at the heart of the spiral of 
silence theory.  The more strongly people believe they are in the majority, the more 
willing they are to express their opinions, while people who hold an opposing view 
become increasingly fearful of voicing their opinions and, thus, increasingly silent.  
According to Noelle-Neumann (1974; 1993), this is how public opinion is generated.  
Thus, voice and perceived public opinion create a mutually reinforcing circle.  Voice 
is any public expression of opinion and in addition to verbal expression (Glynn & 
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Huge, 2007; Hayes, 2007), it may consist of wearing a campaign button supporting a 
political candidate (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), putting a bumper sticker on one’s car or, 
more recently, putting a “like” on Facebook.   
The role of the media.  The media are a second key variable in generating 
public opinion.  People “mix their own direct perceptions and those filtered through 
the eyes of the media into an indivisible whole that seems to derive from their own 
thoughts and experiences” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993: 169).  The media work through 
two mechanisms.  First, they create common knowledge (Scheufele, 2008; Adut, 
2008), by increasing the connectivity between the members of a fragmented audience, 
many of whom do not interact (Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001; Cattani et al., 2008).  
As Adut (2008: 79) suggests, we “all read the same thing in the newspaper, knowing 
that others are reading the same thing, creating common knowledge about events”.  
Second, the media provide authority and saliency.  There is a belief that what is 
presented in the media is worthy of being told and, in being told, acquires relevance 
(Roulet, Forthcoming).  The media are a crucial vehicle for assessing the climate of 
opinion at the public level. 
The role of interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal relationships are 
another important source people use to gauge public opinion.  While Noelle-Neumann 
assumed that the “public eye” had more influence on voice, additional research in the 
communication literature has challenged this speculation (Kennamer, 1990; Price & 
Allen, 1990; Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001).  For example, Moy, Domke and Stamm 
(2001) show that fear of isolation stems not only from mainstream opinion, but also 
from the views of friends and family.  By interacting only with those who share their 
opinions and by avoiding those who think differently, “people lose their quasi-
statistical ability to correctly assess views of the environment” (Noelle-Neumann 
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1993: 124).  In this case, society splits into two groups, each of which thinks it is in 
the majority: “a dual climate of opinion” emerges (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).  
 
One of strengths of the spiral of silence theory lies in its construction from 
observations of a wide range of public opinion phenomena, connecting different fields 
of research, from political shifts to the decline of well-established institutions such as 
the church in France (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). The spiral of silence theory has 
successfully linked individual micro-processes - individual voices, to macro-outcome 
- the formation of a climate of opinion.  This approach is particular relevant for 
institutional theory, and specifically literature on institutional fields, which tries to 
associate individual actions to collective outcomes (Kennamer, 1990).  Next, we show 
how mechanisms of the spiral of silence can explain the emergence of a climate of 
opinion at the institutional field level. 
 
The Spiral of Silence at the Field Level 
Our model develops an analogy (Cornelissen & Durand, 2014) between the 
domain of communication (source) and the one of institutional theory (target) and it 
integrates the spiral of silence in the public sphere, and the one deployed in the field, 
as a way to explain the deinstitutionalization of a practice.  Both public opinion and 
field opinion are collective expression of dominant views, arising from the 
aggregation of voices of many individual actors’.  Previous research has suggested 
that the mechanisms of the spiral of silence can also occur at the sub-group level 
(Price & Allen, 1990), meaning that social actors may face being in the minority at 
both the public and field levels, and become sensitive to the majority opinion in both. 
In their study of car manufacturers, Guérard et al. (2013) provide an exemplary case 
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study on how pressure to conform to the field opinion can be exerted by members of a 
field.  In an effort to abandon and replace an existing practice (the production of 
diesel cars that do not filter particular matters), a coalition of social movements 
introduced traffic light accreditation (green, yellow and red cards) for German car 
manufacturers.  The coalition gave a red card to all German car manufacturers except 
Ford Germany, which had been the only company open to negotiating with social 
movements.  At that point, a top manager of Ford Germany called a member of the 
coalition and requested that they get a red card as well, because all the CEOs of the 
other German car manufacturers were angry with him (Guérard et al., 2013: 801): 
Within two hours, I got a phone call from the office of the director of Ford 
Germany.  The assistant of the CEO told me: ‘Mr. Y, you can’t imagine 
what is happening.  Every five minutes we get phone calls from the other 
CEOs of German car manufacturers.  They are telling us that the alliance at 
the German Association of the Automotive Industry…is broken [by Ford 
Germany].  We have to ask you to give us a red card like the others [car 
manufacturers].  [...] Otherwise the alliance with all the others [car 
manufacturers] is endangered.’ (Involved Environmental Activist, interview, 
2010)  
Members of a field can clearly fear being in the minority position vis-à-vis other 
insiders, thus must also monitor their field in order to assess the dominant opinion.  
Taking the three areas of influence that contribute to the spiral of silence at the 
public level, we use the same elements - insider voices, field media, and interpersonal 
relationships - to examine insiders’ perceptions of the field opinion on a practice.  
The role of insider voices.  The perception of other field members’ positions 
plays a crucial role on an insider’s decision to voice (Oshagan, 1996).  Insiders 
spontaneously evaluate the possible reaction of their peers before making a decision 
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to voice: this is what Neuwirth & Frederick (2007) call “peer influence”.  Insiders  
have a strong interest in the engagement of a practice, and are thus likely to express 
opinions in favor or against its enactment.  In a similar way as in the public sphere, 
individual actors that believe they are in the majority in the field would be more likely 
to express their opinions.  By contrast, minority views will become less and less likely 
to be expressed.  Moreover, insiders are ultimately responsible for practice 
engagement or abandonment. Thus, the voices of insiders carry a greater weight than 
the ones of outsiders, especially when they side with  public opinion.  When some 
insiders align with public hostility, they make public view more legitimate within a 
field and create a breach through which hostility can spread.  
The role of field media.  Like the influence of the media in forming public 
opinion, fields have specialized media outlets that play a crucial role in the creation of 
meaning (Lounsbury & Rao, 2005).  These media can take the form of trade journals 
and industry magazines, as well as media networks, such as Bloomberg or Reuters in 
the finance industry (Craig, 2001).  Specialized media create meaning which strongly 
influences the ideas and behaviors of their restricted audience (Fombrun, 1996).  
Recent research on the spiral of silence shows that social actors tend to expose 
themselves to selected media, and these media consequently have a greater influence 
on their likelihood to express their voice (Tsfati, Stroud & Chotiner, 2014).  Because 
field media are targeted at, and tailored to, field members, they appear very relevant 
and exert a strong pressure for conformity.  The opinion they express appears as the 
dominant view at the field level, especially when they are perceived as close to the 
core actors of the field (Lounsbury & Rao, 2005).  In the finance industry, the idea of 
extreme bonuses was entertained by press outlets such Trader Monthly, a lifestyle 
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magazine aimed at pitching luxury products to top-earnings actor of the field with the 
motto “See it, make it, spend it”. 
The role of interpersonal relationships within the field.  At the field level, 
people interact with both outsiders, who will be sensitive to public opinion, and other 
insiders, who will be sensitive to field opinion.  Within peer groups, insiders will have 
closer connections and more interactions with specific field members.  Research on 
the spiral of silence shows that, in broad contexts, social actors are more commonly 
influenced by friends and family (Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001).  Similarly, insiders 
are greatly influenced by other field members with whom they interact frequently, 
such as direct colleagues or friends within the field. 
 
Insider Voices: From Public Opinion to Field Opinion 
Fear of being in the minority and perceptions of the dominant opinion 
influence an agents’ decision to speak up or stay silent about a practice. When they 
evaluate the climate of opinion to decide whether they should voice or not, insiders 
represent a special case.  Both the climate of opinion in the broad society (public 
opinion) and in their more direct social environment (field opinion) affects their 
choice.  Indeed, actors within an institutional field are embedded in two discursive 
spaces and two potential spirals of silence, one at the public and one at the field level.  
Tension occurs when public opinion is hostile to a practice supported by field 
opinion.  Insiders face the dilemma of whether to follow the majority view expressed 
by the public opinion and oppose the practice, or to comply with the majority of their 
field.  Insiders opposing a practice will be in the majority at the public level, but in the 
minority in their field.  Conversely, insiders defending a practice align with the 
dominant view of their field, but they will belong to the minority at the public level.   
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Figure 3 represents the overall model that links public opinion to field opinion, 
and shows the micro-processes through which hostile public opinion can pervade the 
debate in a field.  Figure 3 conceptualizes the link between the spiral of silence at the 
public and field levels.  It describes the initial situation when public opinion opposes a 
practice, the field defends it, and insiders have to decide whether or not to defend the 
practice.  If they do, they will face a spiral of silence at the public level and if they 
oppose it, they will face a spiral of silence at the field level where they are in the 
minority.  Spirals of silence at the public and field levels are in opposition, pulling 
insiders in different directions.  This tension remains until the field opinion changes 
and becomes aligned with public hostility or vice versa.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
What results from this tension depends on whether the fear of being in a 
minority is stronger in the field or at the public level.2 If insiders decide to comply 
with the field opinion and oppose the public’s vilification of a practice, the influence 
of public opinion on field opinion slows, in what Aardal (1998) calls an “upward” 
spiral of silence.  If insiders comply with public opinion, they will tend to silence 
other field members; and if they become the majority at the field level, the spiral of 
silence in the field will become aligned with the one in the public sphere.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Insiders will decide whether to align their voice with hostile public opinion or with favorable field 
opinion depending on the relative strength of the fear of isolation in the public sphere and in the field. 
On the public side, it is obvious that the greater the strength of public disapproval, the more likely it is 
for insiders to support public opinion versus the contrasting field opinion.  However, our focus is to 
understand why fields react in a different way at a given level of public disapproval. Therefore, we 
consider the level of public disapproval a constant in the following discussion.	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baseline theoretical mechanism explains how hostile public opinion spreads within an 
institutional field: insider voices are a backdoor through which field opinion can get 
“contaminated” by public disapproval, provided that their fear of isolation is greater 
in the public sphere than in the field setting.  
This does not imply that public hostility will propagate all institutional fields 
at the same pace; in some cases insiders will not echo the voices of their peers. Any 
broad deterministic claims that link individual actions to a collective outcome are 
thought to be tentative (Creed et al., 2014).  Institutional fields differ in how insider 
voices influence the field opinion and eventually win over other insiders.  In the next 
section, we analyze how the spiral of silence literature explains this heterogeneity. 
 
From Field Opinion to the Abandonment of a Practice 
Once field opinion becomes hostile to a practice, the practice is likely to be 
abandoned (see Figure 1).  However, this does not mean that all insiders will 
simultaneously abandon the practice.  In some fields, insiders will converge quickly 
to the new climate of opinion at the field level, whereas in others this process will 
take longer. According to the spiral of silence theory, this depends on the strength of 
the silencing pressure caused by the dominant opinion, in this case, in the field.  There 
are two possible scenarios.  The first one is when there is a strong silencing pressure 
on the minority in the field (field opinion exerts a significant pressure on insiders to 
conform).  At a given level of public disapproval, public opinion will have limited 
impact on insiders, as they will tend to align with their field.  Eventually, when field 
opinion becomes hostile to a practice, it will in turn exert a strong pressure to silent 
the insiders who still support the practice, thus hastening the abandonment of the 
practice. 
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The opposite process happens when the silencing mechanism caused by the 
dominant opinion in the field has limited power.  In this scenario, initially insiders are 
more likely to side with hostile public opinion, because their fear of being in the 
minority in the public sphere is greater.  However, this time, the move towards 
abandoning a practice tends to happen more slowly.  It may be easier to reach a 
tipping point when field opinion swings towards opposing a practice, but once this 
happens, the spiral of silence exerts less pressure on other insiders to abandon the 
practice.  In such fields, the overall field climate has a reduced influence on individual 
behaviors, whether in engaging or abandoning a practice.  Table 1 shows these two 
scenarios. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Our model advances a second important insight for literature on 
deinstitutionalization; fields where the silencing pressure is strong are less permeable, 
i.e. “closed or not exposed to ideas from other institutional arenas” (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996: 1030).  However, upon reaching a tipping point, i.e. when the field 
opinion switches to opposition to a practice, insiders will quickly abandon a practice, 
and the change becomes robust.  This is because a strong fear of being in the minority 
at the field level makes the field less penetrable in the first place, but creates stronger 
conforming pressures when the field opinion reverses. Instead, fields where the 
silencing pressure is weak are more permeable to public opinion, and are more 
receptive to influences from other institutional arenas.  In these fields, it is easier to 
win insiders to one’s own side in the first place, although subsequently it is difficult to 
make all actors converge. 
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Because the fear of being in the minority is the baseline mechanism of both 
the spiral of silence and our integrative theory of deinstitutionalization, we discuss 
hereafter the boundary conditions in which the fear of being in the minority in the 
field can exist and generate a spiral of silence at the field level.  Our model builds on 
a number of assumptions. Identifying boundary conditions is a key element when 
blending theories from different domains, as some assumptions erode during the 
process of mapping concepts and causal mechanisms (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011). 
Finally, we discuss certain factors that our analogy might underestimate, and how 
those factors limit our theoretical reasoning.  
 
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALOGY 
 As we build the concept of field opinion and suggest the emergence of a spiral 
of silence at the field level, we rely on the plausibility of assumptions from the source 
domain vis-à-vis the target domain (Cornelissen & Durand, 2014; Okhuysen & 
Bonardi, 2011). Because of the constitutive nature of the analogy, our theory may 
seem to “overwrite existing theory” (Cornelissen & Durand, 2014: 9) by underplaying 
motives identified in the institutional theory literature and narrowing our focus on 
patterns of communication as the basis of institutions (Suddaby, 2011).  We address 
those challenges by exploring the boundary conditions and limitations of the spiral of 
silence theory in light of institutional theory literature. 
 
Boundary Conditions for the Spiral of Silence at the Field Level 
Although a meta-analysis of the literature reveals a significant relationship 
between climate opinion and willingness to voice (Glynn et al., 1997), the spiral of 
silence theory faces challenges on empirical grounds.  The current debate is not 
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around whether the theory is supported or not, but mainly on the magnitude of the 
effects (Scheufele & Moy, 2000; Kim, 2012). We explore the literature that 
challenges the spiral of silence theory and its relationship to institutional theory as a 
way to set up boundary conditions for our theoretical framework.    
Boundary conditions associated with the targeted practice.  Previous work 
on the spiral of silence has suggested that an element of controversy is crucial for 
creating the conditions for the existence of the fear of being in the minority.  Studies 
have shown that the spiral of silence tends to emerge for value-laden issues, or those 
with a moral component (Scheufele, 2008; Kim, 2012), where judgments result by 
comparing subjective standards and norms of behavior.  As Noelle-Neuman (1995) 
notes, public opinion does not determine what is right or wrong, but rather what is 
good or bad.  For some practices, such as stem cell creation and usage, no objective 
definitive view exists, and as a consequence the climate of opinion takes its position 
based on a morality judgment (Scheufele, 2008).  Conforming to the dominant view is 
more likely in this case as there is no authoritative argument and deviant moral 
judgment is more harshly considered (Noelle-Neumann, 1995; Neuwirth et al., 2007).  
Therefore, value-laden practices are more likely to trigger a spiral of silence through 
strong conforming pressures. 
In spite of moral condemnation from the field majority, some practices can be 
maintained when they are indispensable for some agents, for example when agents 
face economic constraints and continue a practice because their survival is at stake 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  In such cases, insiders would then hide their engagement 
in the practice to avoid being isolated.  However, a number of examples suggest that 
institutional fields can create mechanisms, such as economic incentives, to convince 
the most recalcitrant actors (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  This happened in the case of 
 	   25 
“connect-time pricing” in the online database industry (Farjoun, 2002), and in the 
governance structure in the Dutch accounting sector (Lee & Pennings, 2002).  This 
suggests that visibility singularly affects the deployment of the spiral of silence.  If a 
practice is visible to other insiders, but not to the public, conformity to field opinion is 
a relatively easy choice for insiders.  Similarly, if a practice is invisible to the field, 
engaging in this practice won’t be perceived as deviant behavior. Therefore, a practice 
needs to be visible to other field members for the spiral of silence to deploy at the 
field level.   
Boundary conditions associated with field configuration. Given that an 
institutional field is a network of social actors, the configuration of the field will 
influence the way social actors are linked and how they influence each other.  Coming 
back to the example of the German automotive industry (Guérard et al., 2013), the 
fear of Ford Germany’s top executives materialized only when their peers from other 
firms started to threaten to seclude them.  This was possible because the German 
automotive field is well connected, partly because of the presence of a professional 
association such as the German Association of the Automotive Industry.  Professional 
associations play a key role in shaping organizational fields, and one way they do this 
is by increasing connectivity among members of a field (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
Connectivity is a macro-level property that relates to the robustness of a 
network and information flow.  In highly connected networks, each member is 
mutually connected to a large number of other members (Wasserman, 1994).  
Empirical findings have confirmed that connectivity enhances the effect of 
interpersonal relationship on the spiral of silence phenomenon (Noelle-Neumann, 
1977; 1993).  Connectivity influences insider voices in two ways.  First, it helps field 
members gauge field opinion.  Second, it increases the fear of being in the minority: 
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insiders who diverge from field opinion will be penalized by strategic or normative 
sanctions by a broader set of other field members.  If field members are isolated and 
do not interact, fear of being in the minority would not emerge (like in the case of 
geographically dispersed fields).  Therefore, we propose that connectivity contributes 
to the deployment of the spiral of silence at the field level, and thus silencing 
pressures will be stronger in connected fields. 
 
Limitations of the Analogy  
Fear of being in the minority and the role of agency.  The spiral of silence 
theory relies on peoples’ fear of being in the minority as a baseline mechanism. 
Although not disputing the mechanism, a traditional criticism of the theory has been 
that it has misinterpreted or overemphasized the cause of this as being fear of social 
isolation (Scheufele & Moy, 2000) – a normative process - and ignored other 
conforming processes (Neuwirth et al., 2007).  This might also be the reason why the 
effects of the spiral of silence are generally found to be low in magnitude (Glynn et 
al., 1997).  Lang & Lang (2012), among others, point out the importance of looking at 
two other non-normative motives: strategic and cognitive orientations. While it is 
arguable that these motives are important in a political context (Lang & Lang, 2012; 
Scheufele, 2008), they are undoubtedly crucial in many institutional fields where 
actors have economic and social ties.  Thus, when applying the spiral of silence to 
institutional fields, it is important to consider all three motives to conform: normative 
motives are triggered by avoidance of disapproval; strategic motives are prompted by 
members’ reliance on outsiders to create value; and cognitive motives appear when 
field members deal with ambiguity and uncertainty.  Those three sorts of rationales 
are well known by institutional theorists (Oliver, 1991; Dacin et al., 2002). Strategic 
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motivation plays a significant role in institutional fields where actors often mutually 
depend on others to acquire key resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Institutional theory has pointed out the role of self-interest in 
refusing or embracing conformity (Oliver, 1991).  Cognitive reasons may be equally 
important, especially in uncertain situations where actors rely on the judgments of 
others to help them make better decisions (Price & Allen, 1990; Oliver, 1991). A 
significant amount of literature in the last three decades has shown how practice 
engagement is influenced by “taken-for-grantedness” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), 
routines, and competitors’ representations in spite of normative or strategic reasons to 
comply with them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
This variety of motives can drive the existence of what Noelle-Neumann 
(1993: 171) call the hard core, “those who remain at the end of a spiral of silence 
process, in defiance of threats of isolation”.  Thus, there is a subset of individual 
actors who are not subject to the spiral of silence (Matthes et al., 2010), and whose 
presence might remain the last frontier defending a practice facing public opposition.  
Hard-core people are not only motivated by ideology, socio-cultural and 
psychological reasons (Scheufele & Moy, 2000), but also simply by instrumentalism 
(Oliver, 1991).  Some insiders are strongly vested in upholding a particular practice, 
such as top executives with golden parachutes (Fiss et al. 2012), and this can form the 
basis for a hard-core group. We acknowledge the variety of motives at the agent level, 
they do not obstruct the basic mechanism of the spiral of silence (Lang & Lang, 2012; 
Kim, 2012; Matthes, et al. 2012).  The presence of a hard-core contingent can slow 
down the mechanisms identified in this paper.   Our theoretical framework does not 
include this level of granularity, neither does it emphasize agency, although multiple 
motives might play a crucial role in evaluating the strength of the silencing at the field 
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versus at the public level.  Future research could examine the mix of motives in 
avoiding being in the minority, and those situations where hard-core contingents help 
maintain publicly disapproved practices.  
Endogeneity between institutions and public opinion: the role of media.  
The existence of democratic and representative media is a crucial element for 
understanding the close relationship between public opinion and institutions.  
Although a spiral of silence can exist without the media (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), and 
in both democratic and authoritarian contexts (Matthes et al., 2012), it relies on access 
to the media and the opportunity to express oneself through the media (Woong Yun & 
Park, 2011).  Recent theorization of the spiral of silence identified the media and its 
use as sources of reflexivity (Slater, 2007; Tsfati et al, 2014).  The content of media 
influences how it is used, and in turn how it affects individual behaviors.  For 
example, individuals are likely to avoid media that condemn their behavior and to 
select sources of information that are friendly and confirm their pre-existing beliefs 
(Tsfati et al., 2014).  
When affected by public opinion, institutions can also shape the media, which 
in turn impact public opinion.  For example, hardcore practices in the porn industry 
illustrate how media create reflexivity in the interaction between public opinion and 
institutions.  Despite public disapproval, actors in the early porn industry successfully 
sustained several sexual practices in filming porn in the 1970s, particularly 
homosexual sex (Escoffier, 2009).  However, the public’s acceptance of those 
practices has significantly relied on films made by mainstream cinema, where “the 
pornographic potential of film was an important factor driving its development” 
(McNair, 2012: 11).  In other words, the cinema helped bring porn into the 
mainstream, while porn contributed to the development of cinema, suggesting a 
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circular relationship between public opinion and institutions, through the intermediary 
role of the media. 
Our model regards media as a fixed, rather than a moving, part.  We assume 
the climate of opinion and its impact on behaviors does not affect media to the extent 
it influences the causal mechanisms we unveil.  The emergent role of social media, 
through which users themselves partially create content (Burns, 2008), represents an 
interesting case.  On one hand, social media ensure broad participation and rely on 
decentralization and large-scale diffusion.  Organizations find it difficult to exert 
control on such media (Pallas, Strannegård & Jonsson, 2014), and those media 
become a less biased source of information and more adequately reflects public 
opinion.  For example, Twitter is now used to mirror the political landscape and has 
some predictive power regarding the results of elections (Tumasjan et al., 2010).  On 
the other hand, whenever possible individuals tend to seek media sources that reflect 
their own beliefs (Schulz & Roessler, 2012) although they are still subject to the fear 
of being in the minority, even in their online expression (Kim, Kim & Oh, 2014).  
Thus, social media create two contradictory effects on the spiral of silence 
mechanism: individual actors select information that is consistent with their prior 
views, but at the same time, social media increase their likelihood to be exposed to the 
majority view.  Therefore, it is not clear how social media will impact our theoretical 
model: it would depend on the motivation of the actors.  Social media will allow 
unbiased actors to assess public opinion more accurately, while partisan actors will 
self-select sources that support their beliefs and reproduce and diffuse this 
information. 
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DISCUSSION 
Building on our constitutive analogy between the public and institutional 
fields, we integrate concepts and key vocabularies to contribute to both the source 
(communication science) and the target domain (institutional theory).  For 
institutional theorists, our approach offers a multi-level theory to bridge the gap 
between outsider- and insider-driven deinstitutionalization, building on the link 
between the baseline mechanism of fear of being in the minority and the emergence 
of a shared interpretation regarding a practice.  At the institutional level, this link 
between micro-processes and macro outcomes explains how contradictory 
institutional prescriptions can converge through the homogenization of distinct 
climates of opinion.  In addition, we contribute to the mass-communication literature 
by offering a robust account of the institutional-level of analysis and including 
institutional field as a source of an alternative climate of opinion. 
 
Contribution to Institutional Theory 
This paper brings a number of contributions to institutional theory, in 
particular to the literature on deinstitutionalization, the debate on linking micro 
behaviors to macro-level outcomes, and in understanding interactions between 
different social arenas and institutional fields. To conclude, we discuss how our 
theoretical framework relates to existing approaches on the acceptance of institutional 
ideas, and how voice and fear of being in the minority may further develop 
institutional theory.   
Deinstitutionalization literature.  While institutionalization is a well-
explored mechanism, deinstitutionalization and especially outsider-driven 
deinstitutionalization has received limited attention (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
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Insider- and outsider-driven deinstitutionalization have been usually treated 
separately.  Our framework bridges this gap by explaining how public opinion can 
mobilize support of insiders and, eventually, deinstitutionalize a practice.  Because of 
the fear of being in the minority, insiders can support deinstitutionalization in order to 
align themselves with public opinion. Also, the present study contributes to the 
literature on institutional work, when individuals and organization actively configure 
their institutional environments (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011).  We suggest that 
institutional maintenance and disruption are two sides of the same coin;  disruption 
can trigger maintenance, and vice versa.  
Micro-macro link.  Our study advances the study of multi-level approaches 
to institutions.  Recent articles have called for a shift in focus towards a more 
interaction-centered view of institutions, with emphasis on negotiation of practices 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Creed et al., 2014).  While this perspective on “inhabited 
institutions” strives to link micro-processes of interaction with macro-level outcomes, 
we offer the spiral of silence as a theoretical bridge to link those two levels of 
analysis.  The spiral of silence theory helps understand how individual reactions 
create changes at the level of the overall field: through their voices and the influence 
on field opinion.  Fear of being in the minority is a process of self-regulation and 
enables us to capture tensions between overlapping memberships of individual actors.  
Our approach relies on the nested nature of climates of opinion and tensions existing 
between different sources of conforming pressures.  We explain how the conflicting 
prescriptions of the public and the field can be resolved. 
Fields’ ‘nestedness’.  While we focus on deinstitutionalization, our model has 
more general implications for understanding fields’ ‘nestedness’.  While recent 
research has focused on the interstitial space between fields (Furnari, 2014), we focus 
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on their overlap.  This resonates with research on institutional complexity, where 
actors are dependent upon multiple and incompatible institutional arrangements 
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  Although we focus on ‘nestedness’ within the broad 
public, fields can be nested in each other: for example, the investment banking 
industry is part of the broader field of the finance industry (Roulet, Forthcoming).  In 
addition, the finance industry reacted in some way to practices enacted in the subfield 
of investment banking.  Robert Wilmers, CEO of the American commercial bank 
M&T, attacked the risky practices of investment bankers, and praised the virtues of 
the “good” commercial banks (M&T Bank, 2010).  ‘Nestedness’ of fields creates 
multiple climates of opinion, and thus potentially contradictory pressures to conform.  
Still, while all actors are sensitive to isolation in the public sphere, they might not fear 
being in the minority at some field levels.  In the case of Robert Wilmers, his position 
was motivated by conforming pressures at the public level: he opposes investment 
banking practices, because they are targeted by public opinion.  Thus, we see how 
public opinion actually influences relationships and pressures between institutional 
fields. 
 
Finally, our spiral of silence approach suggests that the processes of 
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization rely on the voice of actors within fields, 
which are then triggered by an individual feeling - fear of being in the minority.  
Potentially, these two concepts can enrich current institutional theory research.  Our 
first key concept is fear of being in the minority, a self–regulation process that 
explains conformity to institutional prescriptions but also helps account for multiple 
levels of embeddedness (institutional field members are also part of broader contexts), 
a key suggestion of the inhabited institutions approach (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006).  
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Our approach complements Zilber’s (2006) perspective on translating myths from 
broad to local institutional levels: the spiral of silence explains how institutional 
prescriptions at the public level “translate” at a local level, and how the dynamics of 
local spheres can either lead to rejection or enactment of public prescriptions.  Our 
second key theoretical element is voice, the simple outward expression of individual 
actors.  Voice helps explain the spread of support or hostility towards institutional 
prescriptions.  This “voice model of institutionalization” also echoes existing 
institutional theorization. 
The idea that voice and silence affect institutions aligns with the concept of 
institutional work, which recognizes the power of individuals and organizations to 
change their institutional environments (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011).  Voice is 
a key unit of analysis in understanding both maintaining and disrupting institutional 
work.  Voice is the medium through which activists and social movements disrupt 
institutionalized practices (Hiatt, Sine & Tolbert, 2009), but it can also expose 
supporting rationale for defensive institutional work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
However, maintenance and disruption have not been conceptualized through the lens 
of voice yet (i.e. the simple expression of an opinion), but rather through the concept 
of discourse, which focuses on the framing and the content of this expression 
(Phillips, et al. 2004).   
The conformity mechanism generated by fear of being in the minority also 
echoes the literature on emotions and institutional work (Creed et al. 2014; Voronov 
& Vince, 2012) by emphasizing social and emotional bonds to understand individual 
actors’ motivations for participating in institutionalization or deinstitutionalization 
processes.  But fear of being in the minority is also related to a well-identified driver 
of institutional change: identity (Creed, et al. 2010).  The choice of aligning with the 
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field or the public is comparable to the tension between a field’s aspired and ascribed 
identity.  Identification with the field can drive adherence to a logic and thus practice 
engagement (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012).  Similarly, actors’ identification 
with a field would positively moderate their fear of being in the minority.  The spiral 
of silence theory differs from broader approaches to institutional change by focusing 
on how individual self-regulation processes aggregate at the field level, and ultimately 
determine institutional resistance or change.  Identity, discourses, or emotions can 
trigger institutional change but they tend to remain at a unique level of analysis, while 
self-regulation processes can bridge the gap between multiple levels of analysis. 
 
Contribution to the Spiral of Silence and Mass Communication Literature 
The mass communication literature has established the crucial role of referent 
groups in influencing voice (Price & Allen, 1990; Oshagan, 1996; Neuwirth & 
Frederick, 2004; Kim, 2012), but has focused relatively little attention on 
understanding their dynamics.  We explore theoretically the dynamics of opinion in 
referent groups by defining field opinion as an alternative climate of opinion 
compared with public opinion, thus following Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) call for 
research on dual climates of opinion.  By focusing on institutional fields, our model 
advances a situation of multiple competing horizontal spirals of silence, rather than 
vertical and cascading spirals of silence (Bowen & Blackmon, 2003).  As Lammers & 
Barbour (2006) did for organizational communication, we offer a more robust account 
of the institutional level of analysis for mass communication research.  In this sense, 
we discuss the importance of “institutional messages” for mass communication 
research (Lammers, 2011; Lammers & Barbour, 2006), as our theory explains the 
formation of messages from individual actions to institutional fields.  Our multi-level 
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approach extends the concept of institutional messages by building on a number of 
Suddaby’s (2011) points: our theory places individual actors at the center of the 
transmissions of those institutional messages, and explains how patterns of 
communication can shape institutional change. 
Our study also explains why empirical studies found a low magnitude for the 
effects of the spiral of silence effects (Glynn et al., 1997): public opinion exerts little 
influence on some actors, either because they are in a relatively impermeable field, or 
because they and their referent group have limited exposure to outsiders’ voices.  In 
addition, the spiral of silence originated and has been tested mostly on normative 
motives, and not strategic or cognitive motives.  The latter are key aspects of 
institutional fields, therefore we expect the spiral of silence to strongly affect contexts 
where multiple ties between actors and their various dimensions generate strong 
motivations in order to avoid being in the minority. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We explain how public opinion can affect institutional fields.  We theorize 
specifically on the development of discursive conflicts regarding practices at the 
societal and field levels, the relationship between public opinion and field opinion, 
and the deinstitutionalization of these practices.  We argue that institutional fields act 
as reference groups for their members, and the dominant opinion in a field can exert 
strong pressure on insiders to conform, and thus abandon a practice when the majority 
of their field oppose it.  Fear of being in the minority brings about a spiral of silence, 
which ultimately silences minority supporters of a practice.  Field opinions are, 
however, nested in the broader arena of public opinion.  When public opinion opposes 
a practice, it exerts a constraining influence on institutional fields and this influence is 
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mediated by insider voices.  When field opinion supports a practice against public 
opinion, insiders must either comply with the public opinion, or stick with the 
majority of their field.  The outcome of this tension depends on the deployment of the 
spiral of silence within the field.  In fields that exert a strong silencing pressure on 
their members, insiders are less likely to align with public opinion’s hostility initially, 
but once a majority of field members agree with public opinion, field opinion exerts a 
greater pressure on other members to comply and abandon a practice.  On the 
contrary, for fields that exert weak silencing pressure, insider voices more easily align 
with public opinion in the first part of the process, but once field and public opinion 
are aligned, field opinion exerts less pressure to conform on the remaining insiders 
who still engage in the practice. 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
Public opinion, field opinion and deinstitutionalization 
 	  
 
 
FIGURE 2 
A schematic representation of the spiral of silence theory 
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FIGURE 3 
Schematic summary of the impact of public opinion on deinstitutionalization  
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